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Report on tbe causes of, and circumstances attending, tbe 
explosion whicb occurred at Bickersbaw Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 




26th February. 1960. 
The Right Honourable Richard I¥ood. Id.P., 
Minis/er of Power. 
SIR. 
INTRODUCTION 
(I) ln accordance with your direction given under the terms of Section 121 
of the Mines and Quarries Act. 1954, J beg to report on the explosion which 
occurred behind stoppings in the Plodder Seam at Bickcrshaw Colliery on the 
afternoon shift of the 10th October, 1959, when five persons were killed. 
Another man suffered shock and slight injury but soon recovered. 
(2) On 12th November. 1959. Colonel R. M. Rarlow. H.M. Coroner of the 
County of Lancaster, Bury District, resumed his inquest on the bodies of the 
five men. A verdict of " Misadventure" was recorded in each case, and 
medical evidence showed that all five men had died from carbon monoxide 
gas poisoning. I take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to H.M. 
Coroner for his courteous assistance to myself and other parties in the exami­
nation of witnesses. 
(3) Owing to the circumstances immediately following the explosion \\hich 
demanded the isolation by further stoppings of the affected Plodder Seam,lhere 
has been no physical examination of the scene of the explosion after rescue 
operations were completed, other than a necessarily brief examination made by 
men wearing self contained breathing apparatus. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE COLLIERY 
(4) Bickershaw Colliery is at Leigh, Lancashire, and is one unit of the 
No. 3 Group of the No. 2 (Wigan) Area of the North Western Division of the 
National Coal Board. The following Area officials are instructed under 
Section I of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, for the purpose of fulfilling 
the responsibilities of the National Coal Board under the Act: 
Area General Manager ... ... ... Mr. H. E. Clegg 
Area Production Manager .. . 
Group Manager .. . 
. . . 
. . . 
Mr. E. Small. M.B.E . 
Mr. J. McGann 
(5) Bickershaw ColLiery is served by four shafts, numbered I. 2, 3 and 4. 




Both parts have separate systems of ventjlation, but are accessible to each other 
below ground. Under the terms of Section 168 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 
1954, the two parts arc regarded as separate mines, each with its own manager. 
The manager for Nos. 1 and 2 is Mr. A. H. Miller, and Mr. J. M. Lawson is 
the manager of Nos. 3 and 4. A statutory notice of approval has been issued 
setting out the respective spheles of responsibility of these two managers. 1n 
particular all the surface works are the responsibility of Mr. Lawson. He has 
an assistant manager Mr. T. W. AJlison, but who does not shoulder any direct 
responsibiljty under the Act. 
(6) The circumstances of the explosion on 10th October, 1959, are related 
only to the Nos. 3 and 4 workings, and in particular to the Plodder Seam. 
THE PLODDER SEAM 
(7) The Plodder (sometimes known as the Ravine) Seam has a worked 
section at Bickershaw of about 6 feet. It lies immediately over the Haigh Yard 
Seam. These two seams, and their associated dirt bands, have an overall 
thickness of 18 feel. The Plodder Seam is well known in the coalfields as one 
liable to spontaneous combustion, particularly in ihe Wigan and Leigh areas, 
and ulcre is at Dickershaw a long experience of trouble from this cause. With 
seams so close together as the Plodder and Haigh Yard, spontaneous heating 
can OCCur in the individual working of either, since the extraction of any one is 
bound to expose, in part, the other. The risk of self-heating is often associated 
with such thick seams in close proximity. 
(8) At Bickershaw Colliery the Plodder Seam was developed in a south 
easterly direction on 3 line of almost full dip at an avetage gradient of I in 7. 
By 1959 a large amount of extraction had taken place and large goaf areas 
formed. Progress was by a developing face to the dip with wing faces advancing 
east and west respectively. 
(9) At the end of August, 1959, only two longwall faces were working in 
the Plodder Seam; Nos. I and 2 Dip Faces with a combined output of about 
550 tons per day. The only other accessible face was the No. 9 East, which 
ceased production on 14th August, 1959 (see Plan). It was still being ventilated, 
and a small team of men were engaged in salvaging material. Of the three 
open faces, No. 2 was ventilated by an air current separate from the others, 
while another split of air was conducted, first along No. I Dip Face after 
wJlich it passed into the Main Level of the No. 9 East Face, where it was aug­
mented by some intake leakage from the No. 4 Brow. The quantity of air 
ventilating No. 9 East, when last measured on 21st August, 1959, was 14,700 
cubic feet per minute, and the average percentage of inflammable gas in the 
return airway from this face as detennined at a point 10 yardS from the face 
on No. 9 East Top Level was 0·95 per centum. Of this gas some was contributed 
by No. 2 Dip Face, the air on which nonnally contained about O· 3 prr centum 
in a quantity of 12,500 cubic feet per minute. A rough estimation suggests an 
average emission of firedamp on No. 9 Face alone of the order of 100 cubic 
feel per minute. 
(10) The No. 9 Face had advanced about 800 yards alongside the goaf of 
the old abandoned No. 8 Face 10 the rise side, keeping contact with this goaf 
as it progressed, while tbe No. 9 right hand or dip side was forming a coal rib. 
BNb Main :lnd Top Levels of No. 9 Face were supported by steel arches. 
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The general dimensions of the Main Level were 13 feet wide hy 10 feet high: 
those of the Top Level, 9 feet wide by 7 feet high at the face, but, owing to 
severe crush probably associated with the nearness of the No. 8 goar, it was 
reduced in size to about 3t feet by <It feet for about 200 yards of its total length. 
(\I) Tbe No. 8 East Face, when working, was 160 yards in length. It 
ceased production on 9th August, 1957, and stoppings were put in some three 
months later. These sloppings were later extended by the stowing of waste 
dirt and by October, 1959, the No. 8 Top Level stopping was 150 yards long, 
and the No. 8 Main Level stopping, 100 yards long. 
EVENTS BEFORE THE SEALING OF NO. 9 FACE 
(12) During the morning of Sunday, the 4th October, a deputy, F. Hodgson, 
accompanied by a workman as a travelling companion, was making an ordinary 
week-end inspection of o. 9 Face. These two men entered the face by the 
Main Level (intake), travelled up the face, and then out by the Top Level 
(return). Immediately on leaving the face at the Top Level, Hodgson noticed 
a smell of" heating" when he was about 3 yards out bye the face ripping lip. 
He also recognised some haze and" sweating" on tbe roof at the higher side. 
adjoining the abandoned No. 8 Face. These findings were communicated to 
the manager who subsequently made an examination of lhe place accompanied 
by the assistant manager, Mr. Allison. Mr. Lawson decided that it would be 
practicable to deal with the heating by excavating or .. digging out" the pack, 
and steps were taken at once to do this. 
(13) During that Sunday afternoon, and the two following shifts, men were 
engaged in removing the packing, and from the evidence of those engaged on 
this work, it is possible that this excavation eventually penetrated for some few 
feet at least, into what was originally the right hand pack of the abandoned 
No. 8 Face. About the heating there was no doubt: the packing material 
taken out was hot and had to be quenched with water before being cast aside, 
and at one time or another incandescence was observed by Mr. Allison and by 
one of the deputies immediately in supervision. 
(14) By the end of the morning shift of Monday, lhe 5th October, it was 
decided that all the heated material had been removed and quenched and steps 
were then taken to restore the roadway side by filling the excavation with sand, 
raced with a sand bag wall. All this was completed by the end of tbe morning 
shift on the 6tb, by which time the road surfaces were observed to be sensibly 
cooler. 
(15) During the digging out operations, and the subsequent re-sealing of 
the affected part of the packing, atmospberic conditions were not unduly 
uncomfortable. Samples of the atmosphere from the general body or the air 
n No. 9 Top Level on tbe return side of the place where the beating was found 
did not, on analysis, give gaseous constituents of tbe character which might 
bave been expected from heated ground of the intensity actually observed. 
rhe carbon monoxide content (0·0014-0·0036 per centum) was not unduly 
high for the Plodder Seam at Bickershaw. 
(16) Although the management were convinced that the heated material bad 
een successfully removed, the occurrence served as a warning that it was time 
I'or the No. 9 Face to be abandoned and stopped off. Salvage operations 
were almost completed, and Mr. Lawson therefore decided to put in final 
;toppings. 
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(17) It is the usual pracLice in the Plodder Seam at Bickershaw 10 seal off 
abandoned panels by first buiJding sloppings in the levels some 70 to 100 yards 
inbye of the main airway from which they were set out. Once the sealing of 
the panel has been completed, the remaining space oULbye the stopping is then 
used for the ihlermittent slowing of waste dht, with the resulL that the stoppings 
are gradually increased in thjckness until they can be finally faced with a 
masonry wait alongside the main airway. 
(JS) It is also usual when ordjnary sloppings have to be built for members 
of the Central Rescue Corps to assist. This course is taken. not as an emer­
gency measure, but because these men are trained in the building of stoppings 
and their help usually results in tbe stoppings being built more quickly. Since 
their training takes account of fire and explosion risks, their procedure is 
always in accordance with these risks whether or not they arc known to exist. 
(19) The building of the stoppings in the two roads leading to No. 9 Face 
was begun on the morning shift of Friday, the 9th October, and work was 
continuous. In the Main Level. the place selected was 72 yards from the 
No. 9 Scouring at a point where the steel arched roadway was about 13 feet 
wide and 10 feet high, The stopping in the No. 9 Top Level was 64 yards from 
the Scouring where the roadway was from 5 feet to 7 feet wide and 3 feet to 
3 feet 6 inches high. The sLoppings were constructed mainly of bags of sand 
with some intermingling of bags of dirt fiJled on the spot. They were said to 
be re-in forced with old arches Or rails or whatever else was handy, both at the 
inbye end and lhoughout their length. During the erection of the stoppings 
the practice was adopted of leaving narrow tunnels about 3 feet square through 
the base of each stopping with the object of pleserving some ventilation round 
No. 9 Face. until tbe sealing could be completed finalJy and quickJy by plugging 
the tunnels simuhaneously with further sand bags. 
(20) Both stoppings were complete except for the sealing of the tunnels by 
about 10 a.m, on the 10th October, at which time the Top Level (return) 
stopping was 1I yards in length, and the Main Level (intake) stopping 8 yards 
in length. The final sealing of the tunnels was completed about mid-day: the 
intake at 12.15 p.m. and the return half an hour later. 
(21) When both seals were completed, the separation doors in No. 9 
Scouring between intake and return levels were opened to provide a free How 
of air from the No. J Dip Face into the main return (No, 3 Brow). The 
immediate resuh of this was that for 64 yards of No. 9 Main Level, and for 
53 yards of No. 9 Top Level there was no positive ventilation. This would 
not necessarily produce at once a vitiated, poisonous, or inflammable atmos­
phere at the face of the stoppings since all stoppings leak a bit at first, and there 
would still be a small flow of air through them if only because of a small pressure 
difference resuiting from the difference in level of the two s(oppings. For the 
two" blind" ends outbye the sloppings the manager had made provision for 
auxiliary ventilation by installing fans should their need arise, However other 
events supervened, and I do not think the operation of the fans wouJd have 
changed the circumstances. However, as an aside, I feel it my duty to say that 
auxiJiary ventilation should have been put into operation as a prudent measure 
against the accumulation of dangerous amounts of inflammable or noxjous 
gases following the arrest of the main ventilation by the stoppings. 
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(22) The No. 9 Face, and parts or the two roads leading to it, were tbus 
finally sealed off almost two months after coal production ceased, and four 
days'arter the heating in the Top Level had been dealt with. 
-
THE EXPLOSION 
(23) At about mid-day on Saturday, the 10th October, when Ute stoppings 
against No. 9 East Face had been finally closed, the one on the intake was some 
few yards short of the usual minimum length of 11 yards put on when stoppings 
on old districts are first built. The manager therefore decided to continue with 
an afternoon shift of a small number of men to be engaged solely on the work of 
increasing the length of this stopping. The shirt comprised two officials, two 
members of the Bootbstown Permanent Rescue Corps and nine other workmen. 
(24) When the building or this stopping had firSt begun the belt conveyor 
originally in use for coal transport along No. 9 Main Level had been shortened 
to that place, and by running it in reverse direction it could be used for conveying 
sand bags from the No. 4 Brow Transfer Point to the stopping site. 
(25) Some of the men on this afternoon shift were engaged in the actual 
builcling of the further length to the stopping: others in the transport of sand 
along the conveyor, and, farther olltbye. others were preparing sand bags and 
taking them down the No. 4 Brow from the Loading Point to the Transfer 
Point at No. 9 East Main level End. At about 4 p.m. there were five men 
near tl1e face of the stopping: J. Meleod, the overman, F. B. Sargent, the 
deputy, J. Dawber and R. Evans, members of the Rescue Corps, and H. 
Tbomason, a haulage hand, while others were several yards away taking sand 
from the conveyor belt. The remaindel of the men were distributed on various 
tasks between the Transfer Point and the o. 4 Brow Loading Point. 
(26) \Vhile so engaged, the men at the Transfer Point heard a thud coming 
from the direction of the stopping, and on going through the separation doors 
on this road, they met a cloud of dust and fumes with some smell of burning. 
Eventually some men emerged from this, and soon it was realised that five 
men near the stopping had been overCome in some way as the result of some 
kind of explosion. Having first regained fresh air at the Transfer Point, the 
remaining group of men telephoned the surface while others reversed the con­
veyor belt so that the top belt travelled outbye, in the hope that someone 
disabled could perhaps make use of the belt to escape. 
(27) The telephone message reached the manager, Mr. lawson, at his home 
near the colliery. After maidng ure that the Permanent Rescue Corps had 
been summoned from the Boothstown Central Rescue Station ten miles away, 
he left for the colliery. By this time, Mr. Allison, the assistant manager, had 
gone underground. 
(28) At approximately 4.25 p.m. a team of five rescue men from Boothstown 
went underground: they reached the No. 9 East by 4.50 p.m. travelling by 
foot down the No. 4 Brow (intake), meeting Mr. AllisoD on the way, and also 
passing two other men who had come from the affected area. 
(29) By tbis time some of the smoke and dust had cleared and a fresh air 
base was set up at the entrance to No. 9 Main Level (transfer point). Arrange­
ments Were again made for the belt to be reversed, and the rescue brigade, 
wearing their apparatus, approached the Main Level stopping where they 
located tbe bodies of McLeod, Sargent, Dawber, Evans, and Thomason, 
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four of them together, and the other some few yards distant. All appeared 
unconscious or dead, and they were immed.iately taken to the fresh air base 
using the conveyor belt. On arrival there, artificial respiration was carried 
out in conjunction with the administration of oxygen but these measures 
proved unavailing. At 6 p.m. Mr. Bond, a Group Manager from a neigh. 
bouring group, Mr. Lawson, Manager, Mr. A. Cunliffe. Rescue Station 
Superintendent, and Dr. J. F. Erskine, Area Medical Officer, arrived together 
at the fresh air base where the doctor examined the bodies of the five men and 
pronounced them to be dead. Arrangements were then made for the transport 
of the bodies to the surface, and for the retreat of all persons from the seam. 
(30) However, the atmosphere having cleared somewhat, the opportunity 
was taken by the Rescue Men to have a closer look at the stoppings. With 
their companions in support, W. Sturgeon, the Captain, went to the Main 
Level stopping and K. Shaw to the Top Level stopping. Approaching the 
Main Level stopping, Sturgeon observed that flame safety lamps, although 
extinguished, were still hanging from roof supports, and that hanging water 
bottles were undisturbed. These features indicated little violence. There was 
no flame to be seen, but at the stopping itself a hole was observed at the top 
about 3 feet wide and I foot in beight, due, possibly, to the displacement of 
part of the top layer of sand bags. From the Top Level stopping, Shaw 
reported that no displacement had occurred, and again no sign of flame or 
smoke. On these occasions the opportunjty was taken by these two men to 
collect a sample of atmosphere at the face of each stopping. On analysis the 
sample from the Main Level yielded among other gases, 0·016 per cent. of 
carbon monoxide and 0·46 per cent. of firedamp, wb.ile that from the return 
stopping was much more lethal with nearly 3 per cent. of carbon monoxide 
and 5 per cent. of firedamp. 
(31) When all men had been accounted for, and these conditions confirmed, 
Mr. E. Small, Area Production Manager, who was then at the colliery, ordered 
a complete evacuation from the mine pending a decision on the next steps to 
be taken. All men were out by about 9 p.m. after an arduous journey with 
the bodies of tlle five men through the No. 4 Brow for about 2,000 yards against 
an average gradient of : in 8. 
(32) Later, Mr. H. E. Cl egg, Area General Manager, who was then at the 
colliery, having heard the principal facts of the occurrence, prudently decided 
that there should be no funher exploration of the Plodder Seam because of the 
danger of a second explosion, and that pennanent stoppings should be put in 
at the top of the three airways serving the seam. Even if the retention of some 
working area had been considered, it would have been impossible to buHd 
further stoppings without placing them so close to the others as to incur a 
grave danger from a subsequent explosion. 
(33) The sites for the final stopping-off of the Plodder Seam were carefully 
selected, with the advice, among others, of Dr. H. L. WilIett, Deputy Director· 
General of the Headquarters' Staff of the National Coal Board, who had been 
calJed to the colliery. It is not part of this report to recount this final work 
except to say that it was conducted under fuB emergency cond.itions with men 
underground only in sufficient numbers to secure the expeditious erection of 
the stoppings. The final closing of these stoppings was completed by I I  a.m. 
OD Tuesday, the 13th October, and, after a suitably long waiting period with 
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no men in the mine, inspections were made of the stoppings periodically with 
sampling of the atmosphere behind them and tests for leakage. This was 
followed by further measures for strengthening them. 
INVFSTlGA TlON 
(34) It was at once clear that an explosion had taken place within the area 
contained by the stoppings on No. 9 East Main Level and No. 9 East Top 
Level. No effects of violence had been observed except the displacement of 
part of the Main Level stopping; survivors had seen dust and smelled something 
burning, but had seen no flame. The deceased men had been overcome by 
carbon monoxide gas and their bodies showed no sign of burning or other 
external injury. 
(35) When the two stoppings were first begun on Friday, the 9th October, 
there would be some immediate restriction of ventilation through No. 9 Face, 
and when they were finally plugged at about mid-day on the 10th, all ventilation 
would cease except for possible leakage through the stoppings. Now the 
estimated amount of 100 cubic feet of methane entering the air current per 
minute with normal ventilation might diminish with the cessation of ventilation 
but it would continue to be tbe main cause of change in the atmosphere within 
the stopped-olf area. In fact with the completion of the seals the eventual 
production of an inflammable atmosphere was inevitable. Before such areas 
become sufficiently deprived of oxygen it can be assumed that the atmosphere, 
in its composition, passes through the inflammable range. 
(36) When Mr. Lawson, the manager, decided to seal off No. 9 Face and 
roads, he was confident that the heated material found at the left hand side of 
No. 9 Top Level had been effectively dealt with. Samples of atmosphere 
from No. 9 Top Level continued to be taken until 7 a.m. on the 10th October, 
some St hours before actual sealing took place. Although these samples 
were analysed for carbon monoxide alone the amount of this gas found was 
not abnormally high. In fact, over the whole period of 5th to 10th October, 
the average amount of this gas found here was 0·0022 per centum, the maximum, 
OD one occasion only, being 0·0063 per centum. The site of the beating at the 
left band side of No. 9 Top Level was last seen some four hours before actual 
seating took place. 
(37) There are, of course, other possible causes of ignition than spontaneous 
combustion. At the Tnquest. the ma.nager, Mr. Lawson. mentioned the 
possibility of frictional sparking occurring from a fall of material somewhere 
on the face or in the roads within the sealed area. Explosions of inflammable 
gas have been attributed to this cause, when in tbe absence of any more positive 
indication such faUs of material have been identified with similarly positive 
evidence of where the ignition took place. 1 have also considered the question 
of sparking from electricity but the evidence of an electrician from Bickershaw 
was to tbe effect that all electric power to No. 9 Face was cut ofT on tbe 9th 
October. preparatory to tbe construction of the stoppings. After considering 
tbe remote possibility of frictional sparking I am bound to conclude that a 
much more likely source of ignition was the heating in No. 9 Top Level, and 
hat the general confidence in the conditions there was misplaced. 
(38) Tu support this conclusion it is necessary at this point to consider 
the experience with No. 8 Face, the one immediately to the rise side, and which 
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was worked before No. 9. This face had no experience of spontaneous com­
bustion during its life: it was abandoned on 9th August, 1957, and stopped off 
on 11th November, 1957. Later the stoppings were gradually increased in 
length by the disposal of waste dirt. ln July, 1959, samples taken on the No. 3 
Brow on the return side of both No. 8 and No. 9 revealed an increase in the 
carbon monoxide content from about 0·002 to about 0'007 per centum. 
A closer search for the origin of tbis gas identified it with leakage out of No. 8 
Main Level Stopping. Various attempts were made to improve the seal there, 
the main purpose being to reduce the amount of carbon monoxide on what 
was the main man-riding road, a concentration, which, although not dangerous, 
could not be tolerated. The measures adopted, which included the buHding 
of a brick wall as a face to the Main Level Stopping, were effective in reducing 
the amount of carbon monoxide reaching tbe No. 3 Brow. 
(39) 1 am infonned that when No. 8 Face was working it was customary 
to leave packing about 8 yards thick on the lower side of the Main Level. 
Between this pack and the coal rib side being formed by the advance of the 
face, a small airway was left so that air could circulate round the fast end. 
A continuous small airway of this kind which would in time become inaccessible 
could not be contemplated in a seam so liable to spontaneous combustion as 
the Plodder; consequently this small aif\llay was cut off periodically by cross 
drivages through the pack about every 40 yards, tbe abandoned portion behind 
being then sealed. Now when No. 9 Face advanced later taking out all the 
coal, these small spaces, and the adjoining pack would be re-exposed, with 
the result that within a few yards of the left hand corner of No. 9 Face there 
would, temporarily. be only about 8 yards of packing separating No. 9 Top 
Level frol11 what remained of No. 8 Main Level. Despite the thickness of 
stoppings at the olltbye end of No. 8 Top and Main Levels, it is probable 
that small leakages of air occurred between No. 9 Face and No. 8 Face. A small 
pressure due to the ventilation causing such leakage would be assisted by the 
gradient, and by the high resistance of the outer part of the No. 9 Top Level 
which was the proper path of How for the air. Small leakages of this kind are 
all that are needed to start spontaneous combustion: the air How is insufficient 
to carry away the heat being generated so the temperature of the material rises 
continuously. One measure against such leakage through roadway packs is to 
raise the floor of the roadways by leaving down part of the face ripping until the 
floor level of the roadway being fanned is above the roof plane of the coal 
extracted in working. This is a long established practice, in certain conditions, 
and could have been carried out in the Top Level of No. 9 Face where the 
Plodder Seam was being worked first over the immediately contiguous Haigh 
Yard seam. But in the converse case, which is sometimes adopted. of working 
the Haigh Yard first, the burying of packs in this way would be impracticable. 
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(40) While" digging out" operations were in progress at the heating in 
No. 9 Top Level, those engaged did not notice any movement of the air towards 
the abandoned No. 8 Face, but 1 feel that, having found distinctly hot material, 
and in the absence of any significant amount of carbon monoxide in the 
immediate atmosphere. the officials should have suspected that most of the 
products of combustion were in fact moving through the pack away from No. 9 
and into No. 8 Face. Such movement would also seem to explain the observed 
rapid cooling of the road surfaces. It is possible that the heated material 
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dug out was only part of that actually raised to a high temperatUIe, and that 
the remainder was still active behind the packing by which the roadway had 
been restored. The air leakage referred to, while feeding more oxygen to the 
fire, would also, because of its direction of flow, tend to conceal the real 
conditions from those working there. If some fire continued at this point, it 
is reasonable to assume that the accumulating firedamp in No. 9 Face, once 
the main stoppings were built, would first reach an inflammable or explosive 
concentration at the higher corner of the face and be ignited there. Although 
new packing had been inserted between any continuing fire in No. 8 and No. 9 
Top Level, it would not be .. flameproof", and it is conceivable that the ignition 
of an explosive mixture first occurred in No. 8 Face and was propagated 
through the new packing into a larger accumulation of firedamp then present 
in No. 9. 
(41) There is other and perhaps more reliable evidence that the signs first 
observed by the deputy Hodgson on the 4th October were indicative of only 
a fringe of what might have been a heating of fairly high intensity somewhere 
on the lower side of No. 8 Main Level. 1 have already referred to the detection 
in July last of excessive amounts of carbon monoxide from the stopping on 
No. 8 Main Level. While the leakage might have been due to expansion of 
residual gas under falling barometric pressure, it did in fact occur during 
periods of very stable pressure, and therefore is more likely to have been caused 
by leakage coming in from No. 9 Face under the influence of ventilating pressure 
and some buoyancy. Indeed it would seem that the progressive advance of 
No. 9 Face was to some degree unseating No. 8 or at least aggravating the 
leakage of air, and I can imagine a similarly progressive tendency to self· heating 
along the right hand side of No. 8 Main Level. )f heating did occur it would 
probably be stifled by the consolidation of the packing as No. 9 Face advanced, 
and so 1 envisage the greatest intensity of heat, or tendency to self-heating 
would be just behind No. 9 Face. Once this face stopped, leakage would 
continue for some time at one place and the heating would grow in intensity 
until its effects began to be noticed within the No. 9 Face and were, of course, 
eventually detected by Hodgson on 4th October. 
(42) There is further support for this view, but for this purpose 1 will 
have to digress on the question of analysis of the constituent gases in mine 
atmospheres, which has long been established as a reUable ind.ication of the 
rate of oxidation (and of self-heating) of coal substance. With the oxidation 
of coal a variable amount of carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide is produced. 
With oxidation of coal at nonnal temperatures a very small quantity of these 
gases is produced in relation to the amount of oxygen absorbed. However 
T. F. Winmill and J. 1 .  Graham· working together as long ago as 1915 found 
tbat the proportion of carbon monoxide varies more particularly with tbe 
temperature, and this gas is readily and conveniently detennioable with modern 
apparatus in very small proportions, down to a few parts per million. Accord­
ingly, spontaneous heating of coal substance is always associated with a rise 
in the ratio of carbon monoxide produced to oxygen absorbed usually expressed 
as a percentage, thus:-
Carbon monoxide produced 
X lOO 
Oxygen absorbed 
• Safety in Mines Research Establishment, Research Report No 142, "Research on 
Spontaneous Combustion of Coal in Mine.s-A Review." H F. Coward. Page 52. 
11  
and Graham suggested thjs ratio as an indicator to be used in the early detection 
of heating. lts value is maintained even when the temperature continues to 
rise and actual fire results, though in open workings, with constant examination, 
other and more obvious signs will tben have become evident. Since there is 
some very small amount of carbon monoxide produced with normal oxidation, 
the ratio as calculated will have a nonnal value for every seam, or group 
of workings, or for a mine, depending upon where the carbon monoxide present 
and the oxygen loss, respectively. are assessed: the indication of spontaneous 
heating lies in the rise of this ratio above what is known to be its normal value. 
From the experience of sampling over several years I am advised that the normal 
value of this ratio for the Plodder Seam at Bickershaw was 0'4 to O· 5 per centum. 
(43) I have alre3dy mentioned in paragraph 38 the increase in carbon 
monoxide in the No. 3 Brow (return) which was later identified with an increase 
in the expulsion of this gas from berund the stoppings on No. 8 Face. Sampling 
of the atmosphere from inside these stoppings was also continued, and ] would 
refer in particular to samples collected during the period 5th to 10th October, 
1959, wruch are also typical of those collected earlier in August and September. 
The results range as follows:-
" ir Composition or air-rree gas per cent. COlD, 
content def. 
per cent, per cent. 
CH4 CO2 N2 CO 
No, 8 Top Level . .. 2-10· 11-16 12-13 71-76 0·14-0, 10 0·8�·5 
No, 8 Main Level ... 56-53 11-18 8-9 76-80 0·15-0·8 2-4·4 
. . . . . . 
• With onc exception (3 a,m. on the 7th) 28 per cent. aIr: possibly adventitious. 
At first glance, the air content of these respective groups of samples might 
be accepted as not being abnormal for a sealed area presuming some inleakage 
of air through the Main Level stopping which was the original intake. How­
ever, the general composition of the samples does not support this. Those 
from the Top Level show a low carbon monoxide/oxygen ratio and a high 
carbon dioxide content, and therefore no evidence of heating but rather 
vitiation from ordinary oxidation. However, the samples from behind the 
Main Level stopping give a high carbon monoxide content (air free) and a 
high carbon monoxide/oxygen ratio, and are thus typical of an atmosphere on 
the return side of a serious heating. 1 n the absence of any known heating near 
the No. 8 Main Level Slopping itself (a possibility which cannot be ruled out) 
the atmosphere behind this stopping must be related to the known heating 
where No. 8 and No. 9 Faces joined. The continuance of an abnonnally rugh 
carbon monoxide/oxygen ratio from the samples collected from behind No. 8 
Main Level stopping after the heating in the left hand side of No. 9 Top Level 
had been dug out should have awakened some doubt of the complete efficacy 
of the measures there taken. 
(44) T do not suggest that the reasoning I have employed should have 
occurred readily to the manager of the colliery and in fact there app::ars some 
little doubt of the reliability of the carbon monoxide/oxygen ratio when applied 
to stopped off areas, and this feature of its application is worthy of further 
investigation. Nevertheless, 1 think it reasonable to expect that the manager's 
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advisers, and in particular the Area Scientific Service, who were responsible 
for providing him with the analyses of the samples of atmosphere, might have 
shown more concern, and made a wider investigation of the series of results 
from No. 8. 
(45) 1n justice to the management of Bickershaw, 1 must record that 
members of my staff, Mr. J. Lane, H.M. Senior District Inspector, and Mr. R. 
N. Forster, H.M. Districtlnspeclor, were in close touch with the developments 
during the few days preceding the explosion. In fact, Mr. Forster visited the 
No. 9 Stoppings during the morning of the day of the explosion. These two 
Inspectors, from their own knowledge and observation, shared the confidence 
of the management that no active fire was being sealed off, but at that time they 
were not aware of the character of the range of samples taken from behind 
No. 8 Stoppings which, as I have already suggested, was significant evidence 
of fire more deep seated in No. 8 Face than was suspected. However, in the 
light of subsequent and closer examination of the nature of these analyses from 
No. 8 Stoppings 1 am bound to conclude that fire existed somewhere in No. 8 
Main Level, or adjacent thereto. This fire might not have been of large extent, 
but was probably of high intensity. Whether this was part of the fire found in 
No. 9 Left Hand, or another, is conjectural. 
(46) In sealing off active fire there is a code of General Regulations first 
made in 1913, and now re-enacted under the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, as 
the Coal and Other Mines (Fire and Rescue) Regulations, 1956. Among other 
things, these Regulations require the withdrawal of all persons from a mine 
during the process of sealing, or damming off, except tbose necessary to the work 
of building the stoppings. ]n addition to these Regulations there is an accepted 
code of safe practice within the coal mining industry based on a large amount 
of experience. ]n 1944 this experience was embodied in a Memorandum 
prepared by a Committee appointed by the Council of the 1nstitution of 
Mining Engineers on "Sealing Off Fires Underground .... This Memo­
randum, among other matters, dealt with the position leading up to the final 
sealing of stoppings already erected in part and, on sealing being completed, 
advised the withdrawal of all persons during a period of 24 hours. Tllis time 
interval can only be an arbitrary one, but from the accumulated experience of 
the Committee it was felt that if in any circumstances an explosion inside the 
stoppings was to occur, it would come about well within that period. I feel 
su.re that if Mr. Lawson, or the other members of the executive management at 
Bickershaw, had felt a remote possibility of fire continuing in the region of 
No. 9 left hand side, or No. 8 right hand side, the final sealing of the stoppings 
on the 10th October would have been conducted in accordance with the recom­
mendations of the Memorandum, in which case no one would have been at 
risk whcn the explosion occurred. 
(47) Another factor which must have contributed to the rate at which 
firedamp collected behind the stoppings on the No. 9 roadways was the fall 
in barometric pressure which began about I p.m. on Friday, the 9th October, 
after an unusually long period of stable pressure which accompanied the sununer 
and autumn months of 1959. The fall of pressure continued into the 10th 
October (the day of the explosion); the maximum rate of fall was one of 
2 millibars per hour during the four hours 12 noon to 4 p.m. This rate of fali, 
• Traos. lost. Mining Engineers. Vol. CIII, Part 9. 
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though not abnormal, is quile appreciable, and would have a significant effect 
in producing an inflammable mixture in the sealed area at an earlier stage after 
the stoppings had been finally plugged. Bickersbaw Colliery, amongst others 
in the North \Vestern Division, receives warnings from the Meteorological 
Office of approaching severe barometric depressions, a service initiated by the 
National Coal Board as a measure of assistance to those in charge of gassy 
seams. It has been confinned that such a signal was sent out by the Meteoro­
logical Office of an expected rapid rate of depression and was received at 
Bickershaw Colliery about 3 a.m. on the 10th October; but, both before the 
sealing of No. 9, and arterwards, this knowledge by the officials of a sharp 
fall of barometric pressure would not be expected, under the circumstances, to 
create any great anxiety in their minds about the conditions in the No. 9 area, 
unless they knew, or were suspicious, that material at high temperature was 
being sealed off. Without this knowledge, or suspicion, the precautions to be 
taken would consist simply of greater vigilance towards the appearance of 
inflammable or noxious gases near the stoppings at which men were working. 
The evidence I have heard is to the effect that the deceased officials, and the 
trained rescue men who were with them, had been constantly on the watch for 
such gases. 
(48) 1n the described circumstances of an explosion behind stoppings which 
were largely len intact, and outside of which no flame was seen to pass by those 
who survived, 1 cannot be certain what part was played by coal dust in carrying 
the explosion towards the stoppings on No. 9 roadways. The No. 9 Main Level 
had been a coal transport road during the working period which ended on 
14th August, 1959, and the manager, Mr. Lawson, stated that until that date a 
stone dust barrier erected in accordance with a National Coal Board internaJ 
Directive was in position about 200 yards from the face. However, Mr. 
Lawson recollects that after production ceased this barrier was removed so that 
the fittings could be used elsewhere in a productive unit. The volatile content 
of the Plodder Seam is 38·1 per cent. which, to comply with the CoalMines 
(Precautions against 'Inflammable Dust) Regulations, 1956, requires the 
maintenance of at least 75 per cent. incombustible matter in admixture with 
the roadway dust when sampled in the prescribed manner. Samples of roadway 
dust were last collected from No. 9 Main Level and No. 9 Top Level in July, 
1959. The records at the colliery show that the lowest proportion of incom­
bustible matter found in the Main Level was 91' 5 per cent. and in the Top 
Level, 89 per cent. These samples were collected some four weeks before coal 
production and transport ceased and therefore do not necessarily represent the 
conditions at the time of the explosion. ]t was stated by the manager, Mr. 
Lawson, that it was unlikely that any further inert dust treatment had been 
given to these roads after coal winning stopped on the 14th August, since the 
main production of coal dust would then cease. 
(49) 1 therefore conclude that the explosion on the 10th October was 
mainly one of firedamp which inevitably collected on the No. 9 Face and in 
the Main and Top Levels when the stoppings on these latter two roads were 
ftnally plugged and sealed. The firedamp would probably reach inflanunable 
proportion first in the lOP corner of No. 9 Face adjacent to where I think 
spontaneous combustion persisted. I believe the firedamp was there ignited 
by some heated material lying possibly within the old right hand packing of 
No. 8 Face just beyond the reach of the excavation carried out at that point 
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on 4th and 5th October. ] think that the danger of explosion following sealing 
was accentuated by the rapid fall of barometric pressure experienced before and 
during sealing. Having in mind the character of No. 9 Main Level as a coal 
transport road, i t  is possible that coal dust played some part in propagating 
the explosion towards the Main Level stopping. 
(50) Before concluding this report 1 would place on record my appreciation 
of the exemplary behaviour of all persons i n  the neighbourhood of the stoppings 
when the explosion occurred. Everyone seems to have acted with immediate 
concern for the safery of the five men near the Main Level stopping, and in 
particular, the act of putting the roadway conveyor into its normal running 
direction (top belt moving out bye) was a resourceful move made i n  the hope 
that some survivor would not be too disabled to use this means of getting to 
safety. That it was unavailing does nol detract from the inspiration which 
prompted it. ] would especially mention the two members of the Permanent 
Rescue Corps, W. Sturgeon, and K. Shaw, who, with their supporting brigade 
companions, made necessarily brief but observant examinations of the two 
stoppings after the explosion. They. above all, from their training and 
experience, would be aware of the danger of a second explosion, and their 
subsequent reports of the condition of the slOppings and the information that 
no fire existed in the open roads outside provided a valuable and comforting 
reassurance to all concerned with the remaining operation of sealing off the 
Plodder Seam. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In summarising comment 1 have made i n  parts of this report, 1 make the 
following recommendations:-
( I )  1 understand that the Council of the Institution of Mining Engineers 
have appointed a small Committee to revise the Memorandum 
" Sealing Off Fires Underground " originally published in 1 944 and 
referred to in paragraph 46 of this report. Although the point may 
not strictly be within the terms of reference of this Committee, I think 
i t  should consider, concurrently with other related matters. the value 
to be attached to the relationship between carbon monoxide produced 
and oxygen absorbed, and, indeed, any other relationship between con­
stituent gases, found in samples of atmosphere taken from behind 
stoppings as indications of continuing fire or of the progress of 
spontaneous combustion (paragraph 44). 
(2) Wbere, with longwall working in seams liable to spontaneous com­
bustion it is  the practice for successively worked faces to strip the goaf 
edges of previous workings already stopped off, further measures should 
be coosidered with a view to minimising leakage between a working 
area and a sealed one. ] n  this connection the already common 
practice of burying packs should be extended. In addition, sand 
packing should be inserted alongside coal ribs, especially where these 
will be subsequently taken out by a succeeding working (Paragraph 39). 
(3) In all cases, the time wh.ich elapses between a working face ceasing 
production and its final isolation with explosion proof stoppings 
should be as short as possible compatible with the rec.overy of valuable 
machinery and materials. 
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(4) Since the danger or an inflammable atmosphere can arise in any area 
or workings to be sealed as soon as the ventilation is reduced in amount 
by the beginning or the stoppings, their completion to an explosion 
proor condition should be effected as quickly as possible, whether fire 
is present or not. ConsequenLly, in seams Liable to �pontaneous 
combustion I rrcommend that sites ror stoppings should be selected 
and some preparatory work done while the un.it is still in production. 
In fact, in some seams where spontaneous heating is frequent, such 
preparatory work has been traditional practice. 
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APPENDIX 
NAMES OF THE MEN KILLED IN THE EXPLOSION 
Name 
John McLeod 
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